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Introduction
Participatory budgeting (PB) began in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 1989, after two
decades of military dictatorship as part of an effort to simultaneously build a
democratic culture and deliver public goods to underserviced communities. By
2013 it had been adopted by over 2,500 local governments across Latin America,
North America, Asia, Africa, and Europe (Sintomer et al. 2013). The World Bank
and United Nations singled out PB as a “best practice” in democratic innovation
and policymaking. In Brazil, several billion US dollars have been allocated through
this public, participatory process. Recent research demonstrates that in the last 20
years PB in Brazil has enhanced governance, citizens’ empowerment, and the
quality of democracy (Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi et al. 2011; McNulty 2012;
Wampler 2007; Russon Gilman 2016). PB in Brazil is associated with increases in
civil society organizations, spending for health care, and decreases in infant
mortality rates (Touchton and Wampler 2014).
PB came to the United States in 2009, when Chicago Alderman Joe Moore put $1
million of his discretionary funds into this participatory process. PB has grown to
nearly 50 distinct programs across the United States. The US PB programs are
within the larger family of PB because of there an emphasis on participation,
deliberation, direct involvement in decision making, and social justice (Wampler
2012; Pateman 2012). In this article we provide an overview of the differences and
similarities of PB in the major Brazilian cities of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte
and the major US cities of New York City and Chicago. We refer to these four cities
when we refer to the Brazilian and US cases.
Our analysis shows that the institutional designs being used in the United States are
quite different from the original Brazilian programs. Most importantly, most early
PB cases in the United States are adopted at the district (sub-municipal) level
whereas in Brazil, most PB cases are at the municipal level. Although there are
some US-based PB cases adopted at the city level (Vallejo, Boston, Greensboro1),
the two most prominent cases of PB are the district-based programs in Chicago and
New York City. We focus on PB in Chicago and NYC, as they are the longest
standing and most visible U.S. implementations to date. In the case of New York
City, it represents the largest amount of dollars being allocated through a
continuous PB cycle in the United States.
1

See http://www.ci.vallejo.ca.us/cms/One.aspx?pageId=52101; https://www.greensboronc.gov/departments/budget-evaluation/participatory-budgeting/about;
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/california-transportation-participatory-budgeting-process;
http://www.pbbuffalo.org/. The Vallejo project has not been sustainable and the Greensboro
project began in 2015 with a total allocation of $500,000. The Buffalo project is $150,000

1

Journal of Public Deliberation, Vol. 15 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 7

At the broadest level this article addresses the following question: What explains
the variation in PB institutional design between Brazil municipalities and the
district-based programs in the United States? More narrowly, we ask, why is PB
adopted at the district level in the US? To answer these questions, we consider a
number of possible explanations, including electoral system and districting rules;
configuration of civil society; political moment of adoption; and available resources.
We draw from case study analysis and secondary materials to account for this
variation in institutional design and program configuration.
Given the differences in PB basic rules, we then turn to the question: How might
the institutional design affect the outcomes generated? There are several subset
questions to address, including: How do these rules alter how people/citizens
engage the processes? In what ways do different types of rules alter the impacts? In
other words, how should scholars and practitioners alter expectations for PBgenerated outcomes based on institutional design? In particular, the article
examines the potential consequences of institutional design and process outcomes
on (1) participants, (2) deliberation, (3) resources, (4) scale of money, (5) public
learning, and (6) elections. By answering this question, we hope to provide
preliminary answers to the “Why PB?” question that is often asked by politicians,
citizens and civil servants.
This article should be of interest to policymakers and academics based in the US
and Europe because it directly compares the first generation of reform (in Brazil)
to the second generation (in the US). Given the vast literature on PB in Brazil, this
will better enable these readers to understand the key differences in these programs.
And, perhaps most importantly, the comparison of the potential impact will enable
us to develop a clearer understanding of what we should expect from these
programs.
The article unfolds in the following manner: First, the article explores the
theoretical and normative values that guide PB. Second, the article discusses the
potential impact of institutional design through exploring variation among PB in
Brazil municipalities and sub-municipal programs in the US. Third, after outlining
key institutional differences and similarities, the article analyzes five key
variations: (1) political moment at adoption, (2) institutional context, (3) available
resources, (4) civil society, and (5) internal PB rules that regulate how and when
citizens participate. Fourth, the article uses a process-tracing method to analyze
how the institutional design affects a range of outcomes. This co-authored article
draws from the field research and work carried out by a US-specialist and a Brazilspecialist. It is our hope that our specific case study knowledge can be fused to

https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol15/iss1/art7
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contribute to provide insights into how variation in PB rules generates distinct
outcomes. The article concludes by arguing that these rule differences shape future
research and implementation questions. Given the likely differences in outcomes
between Brazil’s most successful cases and the growing number of cases in Brazil,
we consider how this will shape practitioners’ and citizens’ attitudes.
The Promise of Participatory Democracy
The goal of PB is to provide a context for people to engage more deeply in their
democracy. Participatory institutions aim to enhance governance, citizens’
empowerment, and the quality of democracy (Avritzer 2002; Fung 2006; Pateman
2012). In addition to the broader effects on democracy, PB has an individual-level
impact on participants. The institutional rules of PB are designed to improve the
quality of participants’ discourse, roles, responsibilities, and impact. The direct
engagement of non-elite citizens is thought to provide a corrective to elite,
technocratic policy decisions as well as to inculcate democratic values among
participants.
PB processes contain a deliberative element, through which non-elite citizens are
brought into discussion, dialogue, and negotiation with one another. The degree to
which citizens engage in deliberation and dialogue is not consistent across different
forms of PB and has a direct impact on the process and its outcomes. There are
numerous opportunities for PB to expand the ability for everyday citizens to form
preferences, effectively communicate, and improve democratic health. PB is
conceptually powerful because it ties the normative values of non-elite participation
and deliberation to specific policymaking and decision-making processes. Political
theorists have been moving toward more unified and systemic approaches for
analyzing deliberative democracy in context (for discussion see Mansbridge 2013;
Smith 2009; Thompson 2008).
Mansbridge (2013) identifies three criteria to govern a systemic approach for
deliberative democracy. The first is epistemic democracy to “produce preferences,
opinions, and discussions that are appropriately informed by logic and are the
outcome of substantive and meaningful consideration of relevant reasons” (11).
Democratic health enables citizens’ considerations to be discussed, aired, and
appropriately weighed (see also Habermas 1996). Second, is the ethical function to
foster mutual respect towards effective communication (Mansbridge 2013, 11).
Promoting mutual respect is an intrinsic part of the process that helps ensure that a
deliberative process keeps running. Finally, the democratic function supports an
inclusive political process with equality (12). It requires the inclusion of all types
of people, which is critical to have an informed, contested environment. It also
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enables individuals in deliberative settings to conduct rational, good faith
discussions to enhance democratic governance. In this capacity, citizens are agents
who can make active choices to govern their society (Gutmann and Thompson
2004).
Although theorists have articulated norms for increased participation in a broad
variety of political interactions, budgets are sometimes missed as opportunities for
meaningful deliberative and participatory engagement. Fung and Wright (2001)
articulate a concept of Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) in which
Brazilian PB is given as one compelling example among others, including:
neighborhood governance in Chicago to check urban bureaucratic power over
public schools and policing; Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP/BIG
STEP), which enables organized labor, firms, and government to assist workers in
employment transitions; and Panchayat reforms in West Bengal and Kerala in India
that have created both representative and direct channels to empower local villages
(Fung and Wright 2001).
According to Fung and Wright (2001): “Conceptually, EDD presses the values of
participation, deliberation, and empowerment to the apparent limits of prudence
and feasibility” (7). EDD places PB in dialogue with diverse initiatives meant to
give citizens an additional voice in decision making. Giving citizens a voice in
decision making can lead to several types of improved democratic outcomes.
Contemporary conceptions of participatory democracy include a deliberative
element that interacts with governance (Fung 2007). Barber discusses participatory
democracy in terms of the values of reasoned rule, self-government, and political
equality (Barber 2003).
Participatory democracy offers an institutional design framework to empower
citizens to have a more substantive role in governance beyond a simply consultative
or advisory one. There is a diverse body of literature, which suggests that
participatory programs might enhance state accountability, perceptions of efficacy,
and efficacy (Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi 2005; Baiocchi et al. 2011; Fung and Wright
2003; Gaventa and Barrett 2012; Gibson and Woolcock 2008; Labonne and Chase
2009; McNulty 2012; Wampler 2007).
Touchon and Wampler (2014), studying PB in Brazil, identify three aspects of PB
programs that can uniquely strengthen democracy. First, governments adopting PB
incorporate community-based organizations (CSOs) and citizens into the
governance process. Second, the design of PB programs allocates greater levels of
resources to underserviced, poor neighborhoods while also increasing spending on
social services which the benefit the poor. Finally, directly empowering citizens to
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make public decisions provides hands-on civic education. The very process of
engaging in participatory democracy provides a powerful “school of democracy”
(Baoicchi 2005).
The participatory and deliberative aspects of PB can serve as citizenship training,
providing a kind of learning whereby citizens leave with more knowledge,
increased self-efficacy, and fewer antidemocratic attitudes (Almond and Verba
1963). “Individuals learn to participate by participating” (Pateman 2012, 10).
Scholars have suggested that when people engage in participatory democracy they
are better able to assess the performance of elected officials on both local and
national levels (Santos 2005; Abers 2000). Furthermore, according to Amartya Sen,
expanding human capabilities offers the greatest promise for producing broad
social development (for discussions see Touchton and Wampler 2014, 1446).
Broadening these capabilities, in turn, can enable citizens to have more agency in
their governance.
However, there are also concerns about the institutional design of PB and a fear
that the concept has traveled too far and lost its original intent. First, there is a
concern that participatory democracy has come to be seen as “ideological, oriented
to personal transformation, and—no coincidence—as white” (Polleta 2005, 271).
Organizational choice impacts the way people view a given process and the types
of people who may be compelled to be a part of it. Polleta, used process-tracing to
analyze the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) of the mid-1960s,
demonstrates how participatory democracy became viewed as driven by principles
instead of impact, focused on personal self-liberation rather than political change,
and dominated by white, rather than black, participants (Poletta 2005, 272).
An additional critique of deliberative democracy, and participatory democracy in
particular, is the lack of concern or relationships with wider society. According to
Pateman (2012), “This means, for the most part, that ‘democracy’ in the wider
society and political system is outside of their purview” (10). Instead of one-off
deliberative experiments, Pateman calls for the creation of a “participatory society”
which requires structural changes (10). Within this context, the institutional rules
governing PB shape the degree to which the process can empower and enfranchise
diverse, traditionally marginalized participants and the opportunity for PB to
become more than a series of small-scale experiments. PB’s ability to affect wider
societal concerns is inextricably linked to its process configurations.
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Institutional Design: PB in Brazil and the United States
We know from Ostrom’s 1990 Nobel prize-winning work that institutional
configurations greatly affect collective action. Ostrom worked within a rational
choice institutional framework to provide a better explanation of why there is far
more cooperation than rational choice theory would predict. The core of Ostrom’s
insight is that individuals are not only involved in one-time, single-shot interactions,
but also in long-term interactions. When individuals have a past history and when
they know that they will continue to work together in the future, there is a very
different decision-making calculus than the classic rational choice models would
suggest. Individuals are more likely to work together to find mutually agreeable
solutions because democratic deliberation is not a zero-sum game but can produce
positive-sum outcomes. It is vital to include an institutional analysis of PB, not just
to supplement the broad number of sociological-based work, but because PB is a
co-governance institution that involves intensive involvement of state officials.
Ostrom’s insights are applicable to participatory democracy because citizens are
encouraged to deliberate with each other regarding how they will spend scarce
resources; citizens and government officials negotiating within PB have a past
history and they are likely to work together again in the future, so there is a strong
emphasis on cooperation. The deliberative characteristics of PB induce participants
to listen to one another, present their arguments, and then vote.
Ostrom’s insights are specifically applicable to PB in a couple of ways. First, PB
encourages deliberation, which involves speaking and listening. As we argue in this
article, PB in Chicago and NYC much more strongly emphasis small-group
deliberation than is the case in Brazil. Brazilian PB programs sought to mobilize
greater numbers of participants, which limited deliberation among participants.
Second, PB encourages the formation of voting alliances among citizens, many of
whom may not initially know each other. This encourages cooperation in
subsequent years (Avritzer 2002; Baiochhi 2005; Wampler 2007). In a case from
Ipatinga Brazil, Wampler uses the example of a rural community organization that
agreed to delay its more expensive project until the fourth year of PB; during the
intervening years, the community members voted for other groups’ projects
(Wampler 2007: 105). Third, PB encourages an ongoing commitment from its
participants to hold government to account and keep the process running year-toyear. Unlike voting every two or four years, PB asks participants for a more
sustained engagement. As a result, government officials know that they must treat
participants with more respect because they will likely encounter each other in the
following year.

https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol15/iss1/art7

6

Gilman and Wampler: The Difference in Design

We analyze the institutional design of PB in Brazil and the United States using the
framework of Fung’s (2006) “democracy cube,” which offers an institutional
approach to better conceptualize deliberation. The democracy cube outlines three
distinct dimensions: (1) who participates, (2) how participants communicate, and
(3) the degree to which discussions are linked with policy or public action. Within
Fung’s schema, the participants in PB are lay stakeholders as opposed to
professional stakeholders or randomly selected participants. The mode of
communication is deliberation and the degree of authority is on the higher end of
the spectrum, with PB’s voting mechanism leading to binding policy results that
government officials implement in turn. Fung’s Cube is particularly relevant to the
study of PB because PB programs generally include participation of non-elite actors,
public deliberation, and the delegation of authority to citizens.
Tables One and Two presents similarities and key differences in PB in large
Brazilian and United States cities. The first important difference is the political and
administrative context of PB. In Brazil, these programs are almost exclusively
adopted at the municipal level, although there was a PB experiment at the state level
(Goldfrank and Schneider 2006). Brazilian mayors are politically powerful, thus
allowing them to implement very different policymaking processes. It was this
concentration of authority in the mayor’s office that created the necessary political
space to create a new democratic process (Wampler 2007). In the US, city council
members seeking to expand their connections to citizens initiated PB.
A second major difference that we identify in our comparative analysis is that
Brazilian programs more strongly emphasize “within-PB representation” while US
programs more strongly emphasize “within-PB deliberation.” By “within-PB
representation,” we refer to internal selection processes in which elected or selfappointed community leaders are extended additional responsibilities not held by
the average participants. For example, community leaders are called upon to
publicly debate or to organize planning documents to propose documents. By
“within-PB deliberation,” we refer to a process in which all participants are induced
to deliberate over policy proposals and community needs. For example, participants
might be randomly assigned to a group where all participants have the opportunity
to actively deliberate over their needs.
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Table 1
Key Similarities Between Brazilian and United States PB

Participant
Selection:

Brazilian PB
Open Call for Participation

United States PB
Open Call for Participation

Neighborhood-level meetings

Neighborhood-level meetings

Annual Process

Annual Process

Lay Stakeholders and
Professional Stakeholders
Communication Deliberation and Negotiation
Mode:
Neighborhood-level meetings
led by community activists
Regional meetings—Short
talks (3 minutes) positiontaking led by CSO leaders
Aggregation and Bargaining
CSO leaders lead
conversations

Authority:

Lay Stakeholders and Professional
Stakeholders
Deliberation and Negotiation
Neighborhood-level meetings that
include facilitated conversations in
small groups moderated by
community members
Regional—N/A
Aggregation and Bargaining
Community residents who sign up to
serve as Budget Delegates lead
groups/meeting

Residents exchange
information, learn new
information and leadership
skills
Direct authority over allocating
public monies
Agenda Setting
Formulation of neighborhoodlevel policy proposals

Direct authority over allocating public
monies
Agenda Setting
Formulation of neighborhood-level
policy proposals

Adoption
Regional-level vote, followed by
municipal-level vote, then policy
implementation

Adoption
District-level vote by residents to select
top policies; then elected official
adoption, followed by implementation

Oversight
Weakly utilized

Oversight
Weakly utilized

https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol15/iss1/art7
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Table 2
Key Differences Between PB in Large Brazilian and US Cities

Location
Participants
Representation

Administrative Support
Recruitment
Types of Projects Selected
Level of Resources

Social Justice

Oversight

Brazil
US
Municipality
District (sub-municipal)
SES: Mainly low-income SES: More economically
diverse
Elected budget delegates Volunteers
Greater emphasis on
Greater emphasis on
representation
deliberation; facilitated
deliberation
Municipality-wide
Local steering committee
council
Transportation and child Limited to no support
care often provided
Government
CSO partnership
Capital funds and social
service spending
Larger stakes
Lower infrastructure
costs so money goes a
longer way
Written into rules
(Quality of Life Index)

Capital funds

Weak because generated
by government

Oversight led by council
members’ staff—check
and balance

Small stakes
Not enough dollars at
stake to influence social
policy
General call

In Brazil, the emphasis on representation is notable in three ways. In the large
regional meetings, where attendance may be between 500 and 1,000 individuals, it
is only a relatively small number of participants who speak and are actively engaged.
Most participants listen and are there to show their support. Second, Brazilian PB
programs elect, from a pool of citizen-participants, “PB Delegates” who are then
tasked with negotiation, deliberation and oversight. Finally, many PB programs use
a municipality-wide PB council (Conselho do Orçamento Participativo or COP),
which is an elected body of 20 to 30 PB delegates who are involved in oversight
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and making the program work. Thus, the Brazilian cases draws upon principles
associated with participatory democracy as well as representative democracy.
In contrast, the New York and Chicago PB programs focus on the direct
engagement of citizens at the local level. The district-level focus was led by city
council members and the community partners; there were a strong emphasis on
encouraging deliberation at the local level. There are several opportunities for
deliberation, which first occur at the hyper-local neighborhood assembly meetings
where residents identify neighborhood priorities for spending. Neighborhood
residents learn about their city’s budget process and the PB process, and then break
up into groups to brainstorm. The organizers compile the results of these
deliberations for the budget delegate phase of the process. At these neighborhood
assemblies residents sign up to serve as budget delegates. The budget delegate
phase follows, which offers opportunities for deliberation and dialogue for a selfselected smaller group of people than the idea assemblies. The US has a long history
of using local deliberative processes; from the voluntary membership associations
Tocqueville lauded to the idealized vision of New England Town Halls (Bryan
2003). PB fits into a longer history of a strong emphasis on public dialog. Thus, the
US cases draw more heavily than the Brazilian cases on deliberative and
participatory principles.

Assessing Variation
What accounts for the variation between the municipal-level implementation of PB
in Brazil and district-level implementations in the United States? We analyze five
categories that help to explain the variation between the Brazilian and US
processes: (1) political moment at adoption, (2) institutional context, (3) available
resources, (4) civil society, and (5) internal PB rules that regulate how and when
citizens participate. For example, an internal rule is the degree of deliberation and
representation within a given process. These criteria help inform the potential
consequences of institutional design and process outcomes.
Political Moment at Adoption
PB developed in Brazil in a political moment marked by re-establishment of
democracy and, importantly, with the widespread interest in creating new
democratic institutions. PB was one among many new democratic institutions
created in Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s (others include policy councils and
conferences). Brazilian PB’s roots lie in the post-authoritarian left in Brazil, in a
political situation that grew out of 21 years of a military dictatorship. New thinking

https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol15/iss1/art7
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revolved around the concept of “radical democracy,” also known as “direct
democracy,” “deepening democracy,” and “democratizing democracy” (Goldfrank
2007). It was influenced by Marxist ideology and initiated by a specific political
party, the Workers’ Party (Santos 2005; Abers 2000; Avritzer 2002, 2009; Baiocchi
2001, 2005; Goldfrank 2011; Wampler 2007).
The Workers’ Party was a reformist, outsider political party that had deep ties to
social movements and community organizations. The Workers’ Party sought to
accomplish a number of goals through PB: Engender greater participation, reform
the policymaking process, build a base of political support, and attend to the policy
and political demands of its base. There was an incipient party system in which
party leaders were seeking to establish their base of support and establish a party
“brand.” The Workers’ Party sought to brand themselves as participatory,
democratic, and social justice oriented (Wampler 2008).
In the original campaign for PB, the Workers’ Party (PT) outlined four basic
principles for PB: (1) direct citizen participation in government decision-making
processes and oversight; (2) administrative and fiscal transparency as a deterrent
for corruption; (3) improvements in urban infrastructure and services, especially in
aiding the indigent; and (4) change in political culture so that citizens could be
democratic agents (see Goldfrank 2012; Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012; Peck and
Theodore 2015).
In contrast, the United States has a more rigid party system that is dominated by
two political parties. In most urban cities in the (e.g., Chicago, New York, Boston,
San Francisco, Seattle, Portland), a single party—the Democratic Party—is the
dominant political actor. In these urban environments, the most important elections
are often, but not always, the primary elections. Democratic candidates must
distinguish themselves vis-à-vis their Democratic rivals. Local-level politicians,
such as aldermen (Chicago) and city council members (New York), work to
organize and establish their own political bases. The PB process serves as one
instrument to reach their constituents. Chicago aldermen often have personal
relationships with their constituents and effectively serve as “mayors” of their
wards, with significant decision-making power. For example, wards in Chicago are
much smaller than council districts in New York City. There is roughly 1 aldermen
for every 57,000 residents. In contrast, New York City has 1 city council members
for every 165,000 residents.2

2

Population data for both cities via the United States Census Bureau website, Census.gov, July
2009.

11

Journal of Public Deliberation, Vol. 15 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 7

Institutional Context
PB in Brazil has been adopted at the municipal-level, which allows their PB process
to access greater resources. By contrast, in the Chicago and NYC, elected officials
representing single member districts implemented PB. These officials bypassed
mayors and other political leaders, and instead have used their discretionary funds
to begin the process. Because Chicago and NYC have single member districts,
council members have greater flexibility to implement PB within their districts. In
Brazil, city council members are elected from the city as a whole and those don’t
have a specific incentive to support a district-level PB.
The relative strength of Brazilian mayors over local legislators plays a role in the
structure of PB. Through powerful mayors in Brazil, PB often enters in conflict
with the city council, whereas in Chicago and New York City, it has been the
councilors or aldermen themselves who have instituted PB. In recent decades in the
US, local-level elected officials have been concentrating more power. This is in
part a reflection of the devolution of services from the federal to subnational
governments for implementation but it is also reflected in the growing power of
city council officials (Hall and O’Toole 2004; Milward and Provan 2000). For
example, since reforms in 1989, the New York City Council has expanded in terms
of size and its roles and responsibilities (for earlier history pre-reforms see Sayre
and Kaufman 1960).
PB first implementation in the United States, at the behest of one Chicago alderman,
was instituted with neither a strong partisan nor ideological framework. The New
York City process is bipartisan, in distinct contrast with the partisan framing of PB
in Brazil. Citywide processes are emerging—as seen in Boston, Massachusetts, or
Greensboro, North Carolina, but to date these have been limited to small amounts
of public monies or pilot processes. These cities are Democratic strongholds; in
one-party dominant districts such as these, the process can be viewed as partisan
and a key issue becomes, “What kind of Democrat are you?” PB is one example of
how elected officials within these one-party dominant urban areas may work to
distinguish themselves.
Civil Society
Brazilian PB is associated with a broader mobilization of civil society. Adopting
PB in Brazil is associated with an increase in the number CSOs. PB’s rules create
specific incentives for citizens to participate in ongoing policymaking processes
and to mobilize themselves into associations. This difference helps, in part, to

https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol15/iss1/art7
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explain the type of people who participate and their preferences. Research on PB
in Brazil has demonstrated that broad majorities of participants and elected PB
delegates have low income, low levels of education, and are often women (Abers
2000; Avritzer 2009; Baiocchi 2005; Nylen 2003; Wampler 2007), thus confirming
that PB rules have successfully expanded public venues to include poor and
traditionally excluded sectors.
Brazilian PB has been a tool to empower traditionally marginalized community
members and enact policies that reflect the priorities of the poor. Many PB
programs now adopt a “quality of life index,” which allocates greater resources on
a per capita basis to poorer neighborhoods (Wampler 2007). This creates a
preferential bias in favor of the low-income residents, thereby encouraging them to
participate. The process is also designed to allocate public dollars to the types of
policy problems that most strongly affect poor neighborhoods (e.g., access to public
health care and public housing, building basic infrastructure). In Brazil, there is an
emphasis on infrastructure projects.
In the Chicago and NYC PB programs, there are not specific social justice rules
that determine the allocation of public resources to low-income communities.
However, social justice considerations are part of the broader deliberation about
how resources are distributed (Lerner and Secondo 2012).3 In both Chicago and
NYC, considerable time and efforts was spent on incorporating poor and politically
marginalized groups (Lerner 2014). The active involvement of individuals from
poor and politically marginalized groups greatly increases the likelihood that policy
concerns of central importance in these communities will be raised by participants.
Of course, it doesn’t guarantee that these citizens’ demands will be meant. One
task for researchers will be to determine if and how the inclusion of social justice
values within the debates translates into projects that reflect these interests and if
there is an accountability mechanism in place.
In Chicago and NYC, a strong emphasis on social inclusion is bringing new civic
voices into the process, but there is wide variation among PB programs regarding
who participates. Some communities have been able to encourage more diversity
than others along various socio-economic indicators such as race, income, and
education. In practice, New York and Chicago have been successful overall in
mobilizing a wide cross-section of residents to engage as participants. While
higher-income residents are still overrepresented in some districts, city officials
have engaged in pro-active efforts to engage low-income and minority households,
for example by targeting distinct communities, such as public housing residents,
3

We thank an anonymous review for bringing this point to our attention.
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youth, and seniors. Roughly a third of assemblies included multilingual
interpretation and translation support (CDP and PBNYC, 2015).
In New York City, 51,000 residents voted in the 2014-15 PB cycle. The majority
of these voters, 57 percent, identified as people of color, in comparison to 47
percent for local election voters (CDP and PBNYC, 2015). Initial data from PB in
the United States, including in New York City, demonstrates that PB is an effective
gateway for getting people to vote. Comparing data from two districts in New York
City, District 39 and District 23, researchers compared a PB voter with another
similar person in the voter file who could not participate in PB because their district
was not participating. The researchers’ matched people from neighborhoods with
similar racial composition, income, education, and voting patterns. Through this
process, researches demonstrates that people who vote in PB on average are 7%
more likely to vote in subsequent other elections (Lerner, 2018).
Research on PB in the US demonstrates the black residents and white residents are
generally overrepresented or represented proportionally to their community’s
general share of the local census track (Hagelskamp et al 2016). But Hispanic
residents are often systematically underrepresented. With regard to education and
income, there is a bit of bifurcation. Lower-income households were
overrepresented or represented proportionally in most PB programs, but there was
also overrepresented among those with the highest education levels (graduate and
undergraduate degrees) (Hagelskamp et al2016). This bifurcation indicates the PB
programs are partially successful in attracting new political actors into the political
system, most notably among young, low-income residents. The programs still
difficulties attracting Hispanics and those with lower education levels.
Finally, we lack information to know if the inclusion of these new voices is being
translated into new community organizations or the strengthening of existing
organizations. Citizens may organize themselves as they seek to have a greater
voice in the process, but it is unknown at this time if new civic voices are being
translated into new community organizations.
Available Resources
There is a greater concentration of resources in the hands of mayors in Brazil.
Mayors prepare the budget and, after it is approved by the city council, they often
have the right to reallocate up to 20 percent of the budget without additional
approval. Although city councils have the right to reject a mayor’s proposed budget,
the outcome of a rejected budget is that the previous year’s budget is adopted. This
means that the mayor has considerable leeway to move resources from department

https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol15/iss1/art7
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to department and from project to project. At the height of Porto Alegre’s PB
experience, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, upwards of 15 percent of the entire
municipal budget was being allocated through PB. This often represented 100
percent of new capital spending. However, this high mark soon dissipated in Porto
Alegre and in other large Brazilian cities. It became much more common to allocate
1 to 3 percent of the entire municipal budget to PB. Nevertheless, this percentage
is much larger than in the US PB programs.
In Chicago and NYC, resources come from legislators who have a decentralized set
of discretionary funds to spend in their individual districts. As a result, the process
in the NYC and Chicago is restricted to a set percentage of councilors’ discretionary
funds, whereas PB in Brazil often has no clearly defined amount of resources at its
disposal. Currently a small level of discretionary funds are being allocated to the
process in the Chicago and NYC, potentially constraining PB projects to smallerstake political issues with redistributive social impact. To date, Chicago and NYC’s
PB programs started with a pre-determined amount of funds and has not used a
needs-based tool, such as Brazil’s quality of life index. Without a bounded set of
dollars, US PB may use different structures to determine need, which may have
longer-term policy implications.
Since 1994, aldermen in Chicago have been receiving “menu money” in the amount
of roughly $1.3 million per ward per annum for infrastructure projects (Russon
Gilman 2016). This “menu money” is disbursed equally to all fifty wards in
Chicago in a need-blind allocation. The PB process in New York City was able to
leverage roughly $1 million per council member in discretionary funds. Starting in
2009 with a bipartisan group of four City Council members in 2009, the process in
2016 involved 28 (of the 51) council members and has a centralized support
structure in the Speaker of the City Council’s office.
Internal Rules
In the United States process, deliberation occurs early and often, and the emphasis
is on within-PB deliberation rather than within-PB representation (for discussions
see Russon Gilman 2016). Budget delegates volunteer to serve, contrasted with the
Brazilian system of electing representatives to serve on administrative committees
or the PB council). The United States process involves a greater degree of
deliberation in the brainstorming phase than its Brazilian counterpart. In the New
York City and Chicago programs, the focus is on educating citizens, providing
learning opportunities, and facilitating small-group discussions. Informed by these
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practices, speech and deliberation have been a vital component of PB’s starting
formula in the United States.4
The current PB process in Chicago and NYC is based on four phases. The first
phase of the process, idea assemblies, offer both an educational and deliberative
component. Neighborhood residents learn about their city’s budget process and the
PB process, then break up into groups to brainstorm. The organizers compile the
results of these deliberations for the budget delegate phase of the process. Attendees
at these neighborhood assemblies vary, with roughly forty people per community
across the country during 2014-2015. At these events, people sign up to serve as
budget delegates.
The budget delegate phase follows, which offers opportunities for deliberation and
dialogue for a smaller group of people than the idea assemblies. Residents learn
about city guidelines, hear from government experts, and work to reach consensus
about which projects should appear on the ballot. The only requirement for budget
delegates is that they are residents within the community they represent. The budget
delegate phase often starts with an orientation to identify common themes among
the ideas submitted; residents then break up into thematic committees, e.g., Parks
and Recreation, Streets and Sidewalks, Public Housing, etc.
A facilitator leads these specific thematic subcommittees. Facilitators receive
varying degrees of training across districts and have unique backgrounds. Some
facilitators have previous experience moderating or are community leaders while
others are relatively new to facilitation. The budget delegate phase is time-intensive,
often requiring a significant time commitment to attend in-person meetings over
several weeks or months. There is often attrition during this phase. What stands out
is that ordinary citizen participants have multiple opportunities to deliberate over
project selection and implementation.
By contrast, Brazilian PB often has a structured representative system—as seen in
the municipal-wide PB council (COP)—as well as in the large-group assemblies.
Deliberation takes places in Brazil, but it is spearheaded, especially in the case of
the large assemblies, by a small number of CSO leaders. Citizen-participants often
politely listen and may learn from the deliberation, but most people in the large
meetings never speak. In the COP, there is also extensive deliberation but among a
limited number of representatives (30 to 50 in large cities). Deliberation in Brazil
4

See Weeks (2000) for large-scale deliberative processes in the early 1990s that engaged citizens
to address municipal budget concerns in Eugene, Oregon, and Sacramento, California. For other
examples of US-based citizen engagement on budgeting, see Center for Priority Based Budgeting
2015 (www.pbbcenter.org/).
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is more likely to occur at the neighborhood level, when citizens and CSO leaders
prepare for the regional meetings. There are often lively discussions regarding
priorities and needs. Many of these meetings take place outside of the formal PB
process. The ideas from the citizens are thus funneled into the main venues.
In sum, the PB program in Chicago and New York City programs provide greater
opportunities for citizens to engage in public deliberation whereas the municipalwide cases in PB more strongly emphasized the role of leaders to carry out key
functions such as public speaking and working on oversight committees.
Institutional Design Consequences
As demonstrated above, Brazilian and US PB programs differ in their institutional
design in a number of ways: (1) participants, (2) deliberation, (3) resources, (4)
scale of money, (5) public learning, and (6) elections. A key issue for this study is
the extent to which PB generates different outcomes.
Who Participates?
The participants in the Chicago and NYC PB processes represent a wider crosssection of people than in Brazil. While higher-income residents are overrepresented
in some US cases (e.g., Park Slope or the Upper West Side in NYC), there has been
a dedicated strategy to engage low-income households. For example, the largest US
PB process to date has been in New York City, where the process has made a
deliberative strategy to target distinct communities, such as public housing
residents, youth, and senior to participate (Russon Gilman 2016). At the idea
collection phase, neighborhood assemblies, roughly a third of assemblies had
language support including interpretation and translation (CDP and PBNYC, 2015).
NYC’s PB has been effective at ensuring that PB voters represent a larger
percentage of previously marginalized residents than in traditional elections. In the
period from 2014 to 2015, 51,000 residents voted. The majority of NYCPB voters,
57 percent identified as people of color, in comparison to 47 percent of local
election voters and 66% of the total population of the participating twenty-four
districts (CDP and PBNYC, 2015). As one black public housing resident told an
author, “I thought all the affluent white people would look down upon me because
I live in public housing—in reality, they were all understanding and wanted to help.”
This comment illustrates how PB programs can generate new connections and
forms of understanding among disparate communities. The emphasis on social
inclusion helps bring individuals from politically marginalized groups directly into
formal policymaking spaces.
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The New York City process is successful at galvanizing typically marginalized
communities, in part, because of strong community anchors with rich ties to
community members. The lead technical non-profit organizing PB in North
America, the Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP) is located in Brooklyn and
Community Voices Heard (CVH) is the grassroots organizing partner for the city’s
process. CVH is a membership multiracial organization that organizes low- income
populations to influence policy change. PBP and CVH have been advocated for
PBP adoption and leveraging their networks to participate. A large organizing effort
helped bring PB to New York City, as Baez and Hernandez (2012, 324) note: “The
CMs [Council members] had never heard of PB before being approached by
community- based organizations.”
In places in the United States where CSOs play a stronger role, there is more diverse
representation in the PB vote (Russon Gilman 2016). In communities that
conducted CSO outreach, there was an association with increased representation of
traditionally marginalized communities at the vote. However, the role of civil
society is unevenly dispersed throughout the process. Some communities have a
strong support network of civil society that, in turn, can lift and amplify PB. Other
communities have less well-established civic infrastructure. To date, the evidence
suggests that PB programs in Chicago and NYC are able to incorporate individuals
from poor and politically marginalized communities. However, we do not yet have
evidence that their programs have stimulated the creation of new civil society
organizations. Rather, in some communities has benefited from already wellestablished civic institutions.
In Brazil, early recruit efforts typically focused on poor neighborhoods with
minimal attention to middle class communities. Those who participate are more
likely to be women, over 40 years old, and with less than a high school education
(Wampler 2007; Goldfrank 2011). In addition, evidence suggests that many come
from large communities (favelas or low-income communities) (Abers 2000;
Baiocchi 2005). The groups that are less likely to participate include those in very
precarious economic situations (homeless, extreme poverty) as well as those who
live in small communities (since they cannot generate enough votes to secure their
policy preferences). In addition, middle- and upper-middle-class residents do not
often participate because they know that they will be vastly outnumbered by poor
residents from large favelas as well as because most middle-class residents do not
depend on the types of social services provided by the municipal government. It is
important to note that third generation PB reforms in Belo Horizonte and Porto
Alegre sought to incorporate middle class and youth sectors into PB processes.

https://www.publicdeliberation.net/jpd/vol15/iss1/art7
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Deliberation in US vs. Representation in Brazil
The Brazilian PB programs include basic elements of deliberation and
representation in their processes, whereas the US programs have a greater focus on
deliberation. There are three key reasons for these differences. First, the US
program was led by the Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP), a CSO that
advocated for increased participation and better deliberative processes (Lerner
2014). As a CSO bringing PB to elected officials and galvanizing support, it has
been focused on community engagement and empowering diverse stakeholders to
have a say in the process. In the original PB process in Chicago, there was a set
number of elected community representatives in the guidelines; the guidelines were
later revised to enhance community participation. In Brazil, a political party was
the principal proponent of PB; they promoted greater participation and less
deliberation.
The second reason, intertwined with the first, is that the Brazilian CSOs sought to
increase the number of participants to demonstrate the worthiness of their claims to
a broader audience. This interest in broad participation was shared by the Workers’
Party, since in the new democratic environment, political parties had to worry about
turning out the vote.
Third, in the US, there is a longer, more well-established political tradition of
deliberation. From New England town halls to public hearings, public deliberation
was within the larger “political repertoire” of democratic politics in the US (Tarrow
1992; Bryan 2003). In the context of the US, there was a greater emphasis on the
quality of the dialogue and debate, leveraging the North American tradition of
participatory planning, community engagement, and small grants. This contrasts
sharply with Brazil’s new democracy, in which they had to experiment with new
forms of deliberation and representation, and find a way to use different democratic
tools.
There are several unexamined research questions about the quality and
effectiveness of these deliberations. Currently, there is wide variation in the quality
and training of moderators. There is also wide variation in the amount of resources
expended by public administrators. Public bureaucrats are often volunteering on
their off hours to help provide resources to budget delegate committees, which
greatly influences the process of dialogue and deliberation. When and how can
deliberations help participants? What is the quality of information delivered to
participants and how does that impact the nature of deliberations? Better-informed
deliberation may increase the quality of democratic debates and improve signaling
back to elected officials about citizens’ preferences.
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A more diffuse, broad-based engagement from civil society could also potentially
engage traditionally marginalized participants. Currently, the US PB process has
had neither the resources nor people power to bring new civil society organizations
into the formal governance process. PB has been able to tap into and leverage
existing strong civil infrastructure. While the US process has aimed to engage
several traditionally marginalized populations including youth and non-citizens,
there further resources are needed to enhance the public learning impacts.
Resources, Scale of Money, and Type of Projects
We would expect Brazilian PB programs to have a larger impact on policy and
social well-being outcomes because of the greater amounts of resources dedicated
to these programs. In Brazil, the start of PB program in the 1990s coincided with
an expansion of public monies spent by municipal governments. Mayors interested
in PB thus had greater flexibility and more resources than their predecessors. PB
administrators in Brazil had far greater resources than their US counterparts. In the
larger Brazilian cities of Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, and São Paulo, it was
common for citizens to propose medium-sized infrastructure projects, such as
building health clinics or schools. Larger projects, such as housing projects, were
less likely to be included because of the costs associated with implementing them.
The policy selection of PB participants reflects the demand for basic infrastructure
projects.
With an average of $1 million dollars of capital funds in each PB district in Chicago
and NYC, what can be achieved? The small-scale investment limits the PB
process’s ability to have a large social policy or redistributive affect. Based on the
current PB funding, further research is needed to see when and how PB addresses
areas of greatest need—and not simply the preferences of those residents who selfselect to serve as budget delegates. It is currently unclear if PB in Chicago or NYC
is having any type of redistributive impact or reaching communities with the
greatest need.
PB in Chicago and NYC often revolves around community organizing and allowing
local politicians to connect with new constituencies. It is not about building broadbased power or radically disrupting the status quo budget system in a visible way.
The decentralized process, with limited funding, results in less tangible big budget
allocation for the public at large. Smaller allocations result in less publicity drawn
to specific projects which may lead to a feedback loop where constituents are less
aware of PB projects and therefore do not place a lot of political pressure on elected
officials to expand the resources dedicated to PB.
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The amount of funding at stake also influences the salience of representation in PB.
Currently, each US implementing locality places a very small portion of overall
funds into PB. While across the United States nearly $50 million was allocated, this
is distributed in amounts averaging $1 million per PB process, typically of capital
funds. Within each district, there are price restrictions to ensure projects do not cost
more than $500,000; given the costliness of implementing government services,
this curtails the scale at which PB influences public policy. Across 45 PB projects
in North America 5 during 2014-15, the average winning project cost $195,506
(Hagelskamp et al. 2016). Across the United States, an average of five projects were
funded.
In the 2014-15 United States PB process, parks and recreation projects were the
most common ballot items overall, followed by school projects (Hagelskamp et al.
2016). Overall, schools received the largest share of PB-allocated funds (33
percent). The least common types of projects on the ballot were public housing and
public safety projects. Public housing projects rarely appear on ballots and also
have a low chance of winning funding when they do appear because of their high
cost.
Elections
We would expect PB to have an important impact on the election of city council
members in cities like Chicago and NYC, but very little impact in Brazil. For
mayors, we expect the opposite. In Chicago and NYC, the effect may be most
important in the Democratic primaries for city races. But here, too, we observe that
the political value of PB for US mayors is low. While New York Mayor de Blasio
and Chicago Mayor Emanuel both ran on a platform of support for PB expansion,
to date, neither mayor has made PB a priority issue or devoted significant time or
resources to the process. In 2018, Mayor de Blasio indicated that his administration
would support the expansion of PB into public high schools, allocating $2,000 for
every public high school, over 400, to decide through the PB process.6

5

Hagelskamp et al(2016) Public Agenda data includes 46 community processes in North America.
Of those, 41 are in the US and five are in Canada. Throughout this article, we have noted when
data pertains to only the United States or to North America.
6
“De Blasio In 5th ‘State Of The City’ Address: NYC Must Become ‘Fairest Big City In
America’” February 13, 2018. CBS New York. http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2018/02/13/bill-deblasio-state-of-the-city/
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After learning about the power of PB in Brazil, in part thanks to outreach from the
non-profit Participatory Budgeting Process (PBP)7 and other CSOs such as Cities
for Progress, Chicago’s Alderman Moore decided in 2009 to cede a portion of his
discretionary funds for infrastructure to the PB process (Russon Gilman 2016;
Lerner 2014; Baez and Hernandez 2012, 320). Having won the Democratic primary
by a narrow margin in 2007, Alderman Moore wanted to try something new to
galvanize supporters. After losing touch with his constituents, Moore enlisted PBP
to engage his constituents to direct $1.3 million in public funds (see Lerner 2014).
Since implementing the process, he has been able to elevate his national profile and
garner support, and voters have kept him in office. In 2011, Moore won with 72
percent of the vote. “According to Moore, PB was the most common reason people
gave for re-electing him” (Lerner 2014). The alderman has spoken about PB across
the country and has even been honored by the White House.8
Following re-election after the initial New York City PB pilot, several of the four
council members who first implemented PB have taken on new roles and leadership
responsibilities within the New York City Council structure. One of the first four,
Melissa Mark-Viverito, was elected to serve as the powerful position of Speaker of
the City Council. Other early adopters have in since taken on leadership roles within
the council’s progressive caucus. The speaker and the City Council helped usher in
a series of good governance reforms to the council’s discretionary spending
regime. 9 The reforms offer a formulaic, needs-based model of disbursement.
Through PB, several City Council members have been able to elevate their profile
and champion a series of governance reforms to increase transparency and
accountability.
The process in the US depends heavily individual elected officials’ desire and
staffing capacity. In places where there is limited staffing capacity, such as
Cambridge, MA, it is more difficult for participants to engage in the process
because there is insufficient administrative support. Although there is no political
or ideological mandate, the majority of the proponents are Democrats, who already
dominate US cities. In Chicago, it took several years for the process to gain traction
PBP is a non-profit: “Our mission is to empower people to decide together how to spend public
money. We create and support participatory budgeting processes that deepen democracy, build
stronger communities, and make public budgets more equitable and effective.” Participatory
Budget Project, “Mission & Approach” September 2015 (www.participatorybudgeting.org/whowe-are/mission-approach/).
8
See Tal Kopan, “Bad Timing for White House Honor” July 23, 2013. Politico Available at:
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/joe-moore-alderman-white-house-honor-094605
9
Council of the City of New York, Office of Communications, “Council to Vote on Landmark
Rules Reform Package,” press release, May 14, 2014
(http://council.nyc.gov/html/pr/051414stated.shtml).
7
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and for additional aldermen to support it. Even now, there are political concerns to
maintain Aldermanic menu money discretionary dollars, which would severely
limit PB in its current manifestation.10 As mentioned above, aldermen effectively
serve as “mayors” of their wards, so there is little top-down party pressure to
implement PB. In fact, one Chicago ward decided after a year’s trial that the process
was too time-intensive and that the turnout was too low to justify continuation
(Bishku-Aykul 2014). Although enthusiasm for the process was cited, the ward
decided to implement a type of “PB lite” titled an “infrastructure improvement
program” (Greenfield 2014).
Although PB in Brazil was a citizen-based participatory process, it was also
embedded in a new representative democracy. Candidates running for office sought
to build a base of support by differentiating themselves from other candidates and
parties. In the most successful cases of PB, such as Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre,
Recife, Ipatinga, and Garulhus, the presence of PB was the central plank of a
governing party that was re-elected multiple times. Although it would be
nonsensical to credit PB as the primary reason behind these governments’
successful re-election, the heavy emphasis on PB was one reason that they won reelection (Wampler 2007).
Conclusion
Under the broad brand of “Participatory Budgeting,” Brazilian municipalities and
US city governments are working to directly incorporate citizens into policymaking.
In both countries, and across multiple programs, governments designed and are
using participatory policymaking to give citizens a voice and a vote, as well as
oversight opportunities. This article demonstrates that the adoption of PB in the US
has several distinct differences from the original Brazilian cases, most notably the
district-level adoption in US cities like Chicago and NYC and the municipal-level
adoption in Brazil.
The institutional differences produced PB-processes in Brazil rely heavily on
“within-PB representation” whereas the US-based processes promote greater
In 2017, Chicago’s Inspector General Joe Ferguson released a report recommending that the
Department of Transportation take over Adlermanic Menu Money, Mayor Emanuel indicated he
would continue to support the discretionary dollars, as he said; “I don’t think those ideas should be
generated out of downtown. I think they actually should come from the residents that make up our
many, many different neighborhood” For coverage see: Alexandra Silets, “The Pitfalls of
Participatory Budgeting” April 24, 2017. wtttw: Chicago Tonight
https://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2017/04/24/pitfalls-participatory-budgeting and the Inspector
General’s note: https://www.scribd.com/document/345778631/CDOT-Aldermanic-MenuProgram-Audit#from_embed
10
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“within-PB deliberation.” The Brazilian cases drew more heavily from
representative democracies, which allowed these programs to incorporate greater
numbers of citizens. The US cases more strongly emphasize deliberation, which
creates greater opportunities to engage in community building, but there is a greater
difficulty in incorporating larger numbers of participants. This emphasis permits
greater public learning and more opportunities to generate consensus around policy
selection. However, this focus makes it harder to scale up these programs,
highlighting a key tension faced by PB advocates in the US: A clear strength of
their programs is the greater degree of deliberation, but this limits the number of
people who will be involved and puts constraints on public bureaucrats to lend their
time and expertise for small group dialogue and deliberation. A spillover effect of
the small number of participants is that it is less likely that mayors, congressional
officials, etc., will pledge extensive support to the US programs. The current
programs link citizens to city council members; these council members seek to
generate new opportunities to participate at the neighborhood level.
In addition, the institutional differences in program design (city-wide vs. district)
means that the Brazilian cases had greater access to resources and more mayoral
involvement, which created the possibility of a greater impact on well-being
(Marquetti 2003; Touchton and Wampler 2014). PB in Brazil was created as part
of a political project that sought to transform the lives of citizens and cities, whereas
the US-based experiences have been much more focused on expanding citizens’
voice in policymaking. The shifts in the US cities like Chicago and NYC may be
more around attitudinal and behavioral shifts.
Finally, the Brazilian PB cases were created at a moment of democratic renewal,
which created to explicitly creating “social justice” rules that ensured that poorer
communities would receive greater resources than wealthier communities. This rule
helps to account for the higher mobilization among poor citizens as well as the most
positive impacts on well-being. In contrast, in the US, the emphasis on social
inclusion and social justice are organizing principles but they are directly made into
rules. PB administrators seek to recruit a broader range of participation and there
are social justice issues discussed during deliberation. There is preliminary
evidence that some PB programs are successfully incorporating a broader range of
citizens into the process but we don’t yet have enough evidence to more strongly
demonstrate how and if these programs are producing social justice-related change.
In sum, PB programs in the US are likely to have different types of impacts than
have been associated in the Brazilian cases due to differences in institutional design,
local context and available resources. Given the stronger emphasis on deliberation
as well as informal efforts to promote social inclusion and social justice, we
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encourage researchers and government officials interested in assessing impact to
draw more heavily from academic and policy works on deliberation. As PB
continues to expand across the US, we should expect that the outcomes generated
will differ from the Brazilian cases, which means that researchers should cast a
wide net to assess how and if social and political change is being generated.
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